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A.ABSTRACT 
A number of normative theories have already been suggested as competing normative 
cores of stakeholder theory. As a consequence, suggesting yet another normative core 
for stakeholder theory will probably add to the confusion facing managers and 
academics who try to catch up with the rapid developments of stakeholder theory. 
However, a critical assessment of some of these existing stakeholder theories shows 
that most of them fail to take the distinct contribution of the stakeholder concept into 
account. I argue that this distinct contribution is the awareness of the existence of 
multiple stakeholders and diverse stakeholders interests. This contribution, though it 
was primarily made on a descriptive level, has profound implications for people who 
want to develop a normative theory of the corporation which could really be called a 
normative stakeholder theory of the corporation. In this paper, I will try to clarify 
these implications. 
B. INTRODUCTION! 
Who is entitled to the results of a corporation? In the neo-classical tradition, the 
answer is almost self-evident: the corporation should be managed in order to 
maximise wealth, and this wealth should go to its shareholders. They alone have a 
legitimate claim on the corporation's profits. This legitimacy rests on a twin belief in 
individual and system rationality, its moral value being grounded in a narrow 
economic utilitarian meta-norm. This meta-norm supports the standard economic 
assumption that in a world of scarcity, more is better than less, hence resources should 
be utilised in the most efficient way possible. This would allegedly be the case if the 
shareholders had full control rights over the corporation. However, many are keen to 
reject these assumptions, for several reasons: (1) social welfare cannot be reduced to 
wealth, (2) utilitarian principles have to be complemented by rules of fair and just 
distribution of the created welfare, and (3) the typically utilitarian insistence on 
individual freedom cannot guarantee the respect due to each human person. 
A first important challenge to the supremacy of shareholders came with the rise of the 
managerial class. It has been the achievement of firm theorists to show how one could 
bring the interests of managers in line with those of the shareholders again. They 
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achieved this mainly by applying the narrow utilitarian principles governing the 
market on the level of the firm. As a result, the power of the shareholders has 
increased tremendously with the emergence of institutional investors on the stock 
markets. Indeed, the market pressure on managers is so powerful that one needs these 
days to design new protection devices, this time to protect other stakeholders from the 
shareholders, because the race for efficiency is often found at odds with important 
human values, including mainly justice and a more egalitarian distribution of wealth. 
Opponents of the standard neo-classical view argue that wealth is not identical with 
welfare, and that society should seek to balance economic and non-economic goods. 
In addition, they argue that decisions about this trade-off should not be confined to the 
political realm. They want to broaden the scope of responsibility of corporate 
managers to these kinds of decisions. Stakeholder theory, being an attempt to map all 
the stakeholders to which the corporation has to pay attention, appears particularly 
adequate to achieve this. 
The normative claims lying at the core of stakeholder theory identify ethical 
guidelines for the operation and the management of corporations, based on particular 
conceptions of the legitimacy of the claims of various stakeholders on the corporation. 
There tends to be a consensus on the fact that normative stakeholder theory involves 
the following basic ideas: (1) morally legitimate stakeholders are identified by their 
interests in the corporation, whether the corporation has any functional interest in 
them; (2) the interests of these stakeholders are of intrinsic value and should be taken 
into account by the management, both when they establish the strategic options and in 
the day-to-day running of the corporation (see Donaldson & Preston (1995), p. 67). 
Unfortunately, this consensus is limited, and there exists not yet a "standard" 
normative stakeholder theory.2 Different normative cores have been formulated as 
explicit moral bases of stakeholder legitimacy, and no agreement has been found yet. I 
experience the very diversity of the theories suggested as normative core for 
stakeholder theory as a disturbing fact, mainly for two reasons. 
First of all, on a practical level, what are stakeholder theorists going to say to business 
people who want to know what they should do if they want to behave ethically? 
Secondly, on a theoretical level, if the stakeholder concept is to be a meaningful 
concept, than the stakeholder theory should be markedly different from other theories 
of the corporation. Normative stakeholder theory should also be markedly different 
from other normative theories of the corporation. I submit that this is true even if 
stakeholder theory is nothing but a genre of theories, as Freeman has suggested: this 
genre must be markedly different from other genres of stories about the corporation. If 
2 See Mitchell, Agle & Wood (1997) for a comprehensive review ofthe stakeholder literature. 
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this is a sensible claim, then before attempting a critical assessment of stakeholder 
theory, one should mark the difference between stakeholder theories (whether 
normative, descriptive, or genres) and other theories. I will try to mark this difference 
after a short critique of contract-based stakeholder theories. 
C. THE STAKEHOLDER AGENCY THEORY 
The stockholders are often said to deserve prima facie a privileged position. 
Goodpaster (1991) is one of the defenders of this position. He recognises that 
management bears some responsibility towards the stakeholders, but claims that 
managers are not agents for all those who enter into contracts with the firm, arguing 
that there is no categorical imperative to further their ends as if they were their agents. 
According to him, such a "multi-fiduciary" approach leads not only to "ethics without 
business", but also to aflawed understanding of ethics, for this approach contradicts 
the common moral judgement that management bears a special fiduciary 
responsibility as agents of the stockholders. 3 Hence, expanding the list of principals to 
include other stakeholders would be a breach of the special status of stockholders. 
Goodpaster argues that when managers act as the fiduciary agents of other parties than 
the stockholder, their fiduciary relationship is only derivative: it has been taken on 
only because it furthers the agent's primary responsibilities, which are to the 
stakeholders.4 But why is the relationship between stockholders and managers 
ethically different at all from the relationship between managers and other 
stakeholders? Four arguments are usually put forward in order to defend the existence 
of this fiduciary relationship (see Boatright (1994)). 
C.l. The stockholders can rightly be called the owners of the firm. Their property 
rights are the basis for the fiduciary relationship between stockholders and managers. 
Since the stockholders are 'the owners' of the corporate resources, it seems natural 
that they have the right to control the use of these resources to their own benefit. The 
right to control something seems to be an essential part of what it means to own 
something. However, it is now commonly accepted that property consists of a bundle 
3 Goodpaster has coined the expression 'stakeholder paradox' for this contradiction. 
4 Goodpaster recognises that the responsibilities management bears towards the other stakeholders, 
though not fiduciary, have moral relevance. Management has the duty not to harm them, not to cheat 
them, not to coerce them, etc. This definition of management's duties in mere negative terms is 
obviously not compatible with stronger ethical claims, such as e.g. the Kantian categorical imperative. 
However, Goodpaster himself recognises that mere respect for the law is very restrictive and can in 
times even be unfair. The following statements reveal the conflict in Goodpaster's'argument: "There are 
morally significant non-fiduciary obligations to third parties surrounding any fiduciary relationship. It is 
these very obligations in fact (the duty not to harm or coerce, and duties not to lie, cheat, or steal) that 
are cited in regulatory, legislative, and judicial arguments for constraining profit-driven business 
activities." (Goodpaster (1991) p. 67). "Corporations are not solely financial institutions; fiduciary 
obligations go beyond short-term profit and are in any case subject to moral criteria in their execution; 
and mere compliance with the law can be unduly limited and even unjust." (Goodpaster (1991) p. 70). 
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of rights with regard to something: the right to possess, to use, to dispose of, to 
exclude others, to manage and to control (Etzioni (1998), Elegido (1995». Society has 
the power to divide this bundle into several pieces, and has certainly made use of this 
power regarding the ownership of corporations. How should the bundle of rights 
regarding property of stock be divided? If we consider that the stockholders' rights are 
limited to receiving some of the fruits of the use of property, a limited right of control 
and a fractional residual right, then one can sustain that the fiduciary duty of 
management towards the shareholders cannot be logically deduced from the 
ownership rights of the latter. 
C2. Only the stockholders have made a contract with the managers, which provides 
the basis for the agency relationship and the fiduciary duty of management. 
This argument is subject to one major criticism: it is unclear whether there exists such 
contract. At the very least, there is certainly no explicit, written contract. It can also 
not be assumed that an implicit contract would have been made, because the "standard 
legal conditions" necessary to assume the existence of an implicit contract are not met. 
To take but the most significant example: there are hardly any direct contacts between 
both parties (see Boatright (1994». 
C3. To give the managers afiduciary duty towards the shareholders is the best means 
to control these managers. 
The fiduciary (agency) relationship between the stockholders and the managers is 
sometimes justified as being the best means to protect the former against the absolute 
power and control of the latter (see supra). The adoption of this fiduciary agency 
relationship between managers and stockholders would thus be guided by 
considerations of public policy. However, if this is true, then the relationship between 
shareholders and management is not "ethically different" from other relationships. On 
the contrary, the control rights are allocated to the stakeholders merely because they 
bear the residual risk. This fact lies at the basis of the fourth argument. 
C 4. The stockholders bear the entrepreneurial risk: they are the residual risk-takers, 
and this risk should be compensated by management acting as sole agents of the 
stockholders. 
Agency theory conceptualises the firm as a nexus of contracts, and in this framework 
the respective "rights" or "claims" of different stakeholders of the corporation are best 
understood as the inducements granted to those stakeholders to perform their roles in 
the corporation. From this perspective, the stockholders are best characterised as 
contracting to assume a substantial part of the risk associated with the business 
venture - the residual risk. They guarantee the performance of the other contracts, 
accepting the risk of net loss in return for entitlement to any net profit. Their return is 
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related both to how well the firm is managed and to how the managers allot to each 
stakeholder an appropriate portion of the firm's income. In addition, given the peculiar 
nature of the risk they agree to bear, they experience more difficulties than the other 
stakeholders in writing contracts that adequately protect their rights. Therefore they 
are most vulnerable stakeholders. This means that they need a special protecting 
device, something like a legally binding fiduciary contract with management. That is 
the reason why they hire managers to protect them against the other stakeholders. 
Undoubtedly, the investment of the shareholders should be protected through adequate 
means; but one could claim that the shareholders are already adequately protected 
through other means (Boatright (1998a)). At first, they have a series of statutory rights 
to elect the board of administrators, to vote on general assemblies, etc. Secondly, 
financial capital has a very low transaction specificity: the stockholders have the 
possibility to get rid of their shares swiftly and almost without cost on stock markets, 
if they think that the return on their investment is too low. Thirdly, the risk they bear 
has also a positive side, for the shareholders are entitled to any superior return the firm 
would produce. No other stakeholder can use any of these three protection devices. In 
addition, the shareholders have limited liability, which shifts part of the residual risk 
on other investors, not only on the creditors, but also on the employees who have 
made firm-specific investments. For all these reasons, one could argue that managers 
should not necessarily act for the exclusive benefit of the stockholders in order to 
spread risks and benefits fairly among the stakeholders. 
Is the fiduciary relationship of managers towards shareholders a sufficient or an 
excessive compensation for the risk borne by this last party? The answer to this 
question is partly empirical (what is the exact risk borne by the different 
stakeholders?), but also partly more philosophical: what is afair compensation? I 
shall now devote some attention to the operationalisation of fairness suggested by 
Edward Freeman (1994). 
D. STAKEHOLDERS AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 
Freeman (1994) has attempted to provide stakeholder theory with a normative core 
based on pragmatic liberalism, as articulated by John Rawls, Richard Rorty, etc. This 
"redesigned contractual theory" attempts to capture the liberal idea of autonomy by 
realising that each stakeholder must be free to enter agreements that create value for 
themselves, and solidarity is achieved by recognising the mutuality of stakeholder 
interests. Freeman defines the liberal idea of fairness by claiming a la Rawls that a 
contract is fair if the parties to the contract (corporate stakeholders) would agree to it 
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in ignorance of their actual stakes.s Fairness would command a basic equality among 
stakeholders in terms of their moral rights as these are realised in the firm, and the 
recognition that inequalities among stakeholders are justified if they raise the welfare 
level of the least well-off stakeholder. 
Freeman has in fact written a new social contract theory of the corporation, where the 
contractants are called "stakeholders", and write their "corporate constitution" behind 
a Rawlsian veil of ignorance. However, one of the principles Freeman derives in this 
contract (namely the principle of externalities) is squarely at odds with the current 
neo-classical ideology. This principle claims that if a contract between A and B 
imposes a cost on C, then C has the option to become a party to the contract, and the 
terms are re-negotiated. All the parties that are affected by a contract have thus a right 
to bargain about the distribution of its effects. The concept of "stakeholder" is thus 
extended beyond earlier definitions (the customers, suppliers, owners, employees, 
managers and local community named supra), to include all those who are affected by 
a corporation (i.e. bear the costs of externalities). Though the principle of externalities 
lacks a serious justification, I shall not attempt to demonstrate that, but I shall rather 
focus my attention on three major problems associated with this social contract 
approach. 
D.l. Balancing conflicting stakeholder interests 
When combined with the principle of agency, which claims that any agent must serve 
the interests of all stakeholders, the principle of externalities implies that all those 
affected should be treated just as the shareholders are. Hence, the principle of 
externalities "is virtually equivalent to [Evan & Freeman's (1988)] problematic 
assumption that all parties affected by a business have a right to participate in the 
business's decision-making process." (Hasnas (1998) p. 28). However, there is no 
obvious practical sense in which everyone bearing the cost of externalities could 're-
negotiate' the terms of the contract. More specifically, this principle is useless without 
any principle for balancing the conflicting interests of the stakeholders. Evan & 
Freeman argue that, though it is not always possible to treat all the claims of all 
stakeholders equally, one should aim at reaching such an equilibrium: they do not give 
primacy to any stakeholder group over any other group: in the long run, the 
advantages granted to all have to average, because a strong disequilibrium can put the 
survival of the firm at risk. However, it is not obvious how such a simple equality rule 
could be operationalised. Does it make sense to say that the managers have a fiduciary 
duty towards all stakeholders, when they sometimes have to take steps that go against 
the immediate interests of some stakeholders? One could agree that managers have de 
5 For a thorough critique of the "Rawlsian" character of Freeman's argument, see Child & Marcoux 
(1999). 
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facto obligations to advance the interests of a variety of people with whom the firm 
deals (such obligations are generated by legal and moral claims generally recognised 
prior to the arrival of any stakeholder theory), and still resist the idea that the 
managers' fundamental goal should be the output of a trade-off between the interests 
of various constituencies having exactly the same weight in the dicussions. 
Of course, much depends on the interpretation of the right to participate to a contract. 
One could interpret "respect for one's autonomy" as not requiring that one has a say in 
any decision that affects one's interests. A weaker interpretation of that principle 
could be that no stakeholder may be forced to deal with the business without his 
consent; this interpretation implies neither that all stakeholders are entitled to a say in 
the business' decision-making process, nor that the business must be managed for 
their benefit. I will focus on the notion of "consent" to the contract below. 
D.2. The adoption of the social contract methodology does not necessarily lead to the 
rejection of the stockholder framework 
A deeper problem associated with the attempt to ground stakeholder theory within 
social contracts is that the adoption of social contract theory does not necessarily lead 
to the rejection of the conclusions reached within an agency framework. Indeed, 
rational social contractors willing to benefit everyone in the community, by creating 
and distributing goods and services, and by providing opportunities for meaningful 
work, or in short, by increasing the economic efficiency of their society (making more 
out of less), could also think of the classical privileged relationship between managers 
and .stockholders as the organisation principle of private firms. There is nothing that 
prohibits social contract theorists from adopting such a narrow utilitarian view of the 
individual and societal good, and indeed, some have adopted them. The best 
illustration is Williamson's transaction cost theory. This approach: 
"regards the transaction as the basic unit of analysis and contends that a 
leading but widely neglected purpose of economic organisation is to 
economise on the costs of transacting over time." (Williamson (1984) p. 338) 
Transaction cost theory has been developed to allows us to see how the interests of a 
multiplicity of stakeholders interact to form the modem corporation. The firm is 
conceptualised as a nexus of bilateral contracts among its various constituencies, 
which contract with the firm to make their respective assets available for productive 
use (Alchian & Demsetz (1972)). These constituencies are assumed to behave as 
rational contractors in negotiating contracts, considering primarily their own interests, 
and able to strike bargains that best advance them. Employees are thus free to seek out 
employers who offer the best terms; investors, the highest return for the least risk, etc. 
These assumptions allow the adepts of contractual theory to contend that the 
privileged position of the shareholders best serves the interests of all corporate 
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constituencies and that the current body of corporate governance rules would result 
from a negotiation between all the parties involved. 
The argument goes as follows. Each party which brings transaction-specific assets to a 
contract will charge a lower price for his assets when adequate bilateral safeguards 
can be devised, i.e. when sufficient guarantees are offered that the cost of his 
investment will be compensated by the firm. If parties cannot devise such bilateral 
safeguards through contracting, then the owner of the asset may charge a higher price 
for his asset. This higher price may be thought as being the base price augmented with 
a risk premium, which compensates the asset owner for the risk that his investment 
won't be repaid fully. Another, cheaper solution, may be to grant the owner of the 
asset generalised safeguards through voting rights. Since one cannot be protected 
adequately against residual risk by transaction-specific bilateral safeguards, voting 
rights may therefore be given to the bearer of the residual risk. Therefore, allocating 
the residual risk to stockholders is supposed to be beneficial to all parties involved 
because it minimises transaction costs. But in addition, transaction cost theory 
assumes that stockholders are in a better position than other stakeholders to diversify 
efficiently their holdings across a number of assets, hence to reduce their exposure to 
risk. Therefore, additional efficiency gains are realised when they bear the residual 
risk. Hence, the stockholders alone, as the bearers of this residual risk, should have the 
right to elect the board of directors. In other words, corporations ought to be run for 
the benefit of shareholders, because as a result, all constituencies would be better off 
It is really unfortunate that an identical set of procedural hypotheses, when associated 
with different behavioral hypotheses, leads to two radically conflicting doctrines: one 
privileging the stockholders above all other stakeholders, and the other giving to all 
those claiming to be affected the right to renegotiate contracts. This fundamental 
ambiguity casts serious doubts upon the ambition of social contract theory and all the 
versions of stakeholder theory that rely on these contracts to provide us with 
guidelines about organisational behaviour. 
D.3. The vagueness of hypothetical consent with the ideal contract 
In addition to the problems just mentioned, the social contract approach is probably 
unable to give a full account of the modem corporation, because of difficulties about 
what constitutes consent to the contract. Indeed, there exists a gap between rational 
(social) contractors bargaining in ideal conditions of fairness on the one hand, and 
actual parties to a bargain on the other hand. Consequently, it is very difficult to 
evaluate theoretically whether the extant rules of corporate governance would result 
from free bargaining among all the constituencies, even if we are able to agree on one 
particular set of behavioural assumptions. 
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Indeed, Evan & Freeman (1990) have argued that even if it right to assume that all the 
stakeholders (except the stockholders) are able to formulate adequate bilateral 
safeguards, some of them could still view representation on the board (or the 
assignment of fiduciary duties) as a better way to safeguard their interests. Then, 
board representation would not be the exclusive privilege of stockholders, just as 
board representation is not the only safeguard available to these stockholders. Evan & 
Freeman (1990) argue that if they were engaged in a fair bargaining process, it would 
be irrational for any stakeholder to give up the ability to participate in monitoring the 
firm and the right to make changes in the contractual mechanism. This claim seems at 
least partly verified in practice. We can e.g. see that bondholders sometimes write 
covenants that permit them to block major corporate changes. Hence, contrary to what 
is claimed by Williamson, it is rational for at least some stakeholders to choose voting 
membership on the board, in addition to whatever other safeguards may be feasible. 
Nonetheless, membership on the board may be unjustified when the costs are high and 
the risk-adjusted stake is low. Allegedly, this is the case for most stakeholders who 
don't invest in firm-specific assets. These groups, e.g. temporary workers, buyers of 
standardised products and bondholders, deal with the firm mostly in the market place. 
These market participants are protected by a series of government regulations and 
laws (that constitute part of the nexus of contracts), and therefore have allegedly little 
need for additional elaborate forms of contracting. Since the link between these 
constituencies and the corporation is rather weak, legal protection is assumed to be 
sufficient to allow them to advance their interests by contracting freely with the firm. 
The power asymmetry in favour of the corporation is assumed to be compensated 
adequately either by the functioning of the market or by legal protection. However, a 
combination of efficient markets, explicit and implicit contracts, legal remedies, and 
government regulations does not always provide an adequate protection to the weaker 
parties, e.g. low-skilled workers or buyers of standardised products.6 
If the current corporate governance arrangements are not modified, although they do 
not offer adequate protection to weaker parties, the only plausible explanation is that 
there exist important power asymmetries, that hamper the negatiation processes 
between the different parties. Therefore, in practice, the common assumption that all 
parties are able to bargain as equals, and free to contract for their best interests is 
highly questionable. If power asymmetries effectively prevent the (real) stakeholders 
from bargaining fairly and as equals, then it is obviously very speculative to claim 
that they are free to contract for their best interests, and that sources of unfairness -
whether real or potential - are sufficiently addressed by contractual mechanisms. 
6 See Ellerman (1992) for a provocative critique of the current legal arrangements. 
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Consequently, contract theorists tend to justify uncritically the present societal and 
corporate arrangements, though these tend to amount to one or another version of 
"might makes right" (Dobson (1999)). 
E. STAKEHOLDER THEORY AND PROPERTY RIGHTS: THE 
STAKEHOLDERS AS INVESTORS 
Viewing the stakeholders as investors also leads to the development of a stakeholder 
theory based on the "might makes right" principle. Donaldson & Preston have 
contended that "the normative principles that underlie the contemporary pluralistic 
theory of property rights also provide the foundation for stakeholder theory." 
(Donaldson & Preston (1995)), and several authors have followed this advice and used 
the property rights theory to bring other interests than these of the shareholders alone 
to the attention of the company. First of these, Schlossberger (1994) distinguishes 
between the specific (financial) capital and the opportunity capital required to run a 
business. Opportunity capital refers to all the social resources which are heavily drawn 
upon by corporations: trusts, roads, schools, etc. Social capital is provided by society, 
which can thus be considered to be a shareholder in every business venture, though 
not of the same type as stockholders. Blair (1995, 1998) holds a similar view on 
stakeholders, which she defines as "all parties who have contributed to the enterprise 
and who, as a result, have at risk investments that are highly specialised to the 
enterprise" (Blair (1995) p. 239, quoted in Leader (1998) p. 3). She emphasises the 
importance of human - or social - capital, which she considers as important as 
financial capital. Hence the investors of financial capital should not be given any 
priority over the investors of any other kind of capital in relation to the company's 
profit. This implies e.g. that the employees, as investors of human capital, gain the 
right to have a seat in the board, in order to defend their claim to their share of the 
company's residual; i.e. the employees gain a right to participate. 
"Put more simply, corporate resources should be used to enhance the goals and 
serve the purposes of all those who truly have something invested and at risk 
in the enterprise. Those parties, in tum, should be given enough of the control 
rights to ensure that corporate resources are used to those ends. If control 
rights could be allocated in this way, all of the participants would have an 
incentive to see that the total size of the pie is maximised, and anyone 
stakeholder group would have trouble increasing the value of its stake simply 
by pushing costs and risks onto other shareholders" (Blair (1998) p. 63). 
Both Schlossberger's and Blair's views consist admittedly of adopting a multi-
fiduciary model of business. However, they do not address a basic question: what 
constitutes a fair return on opportunity, social or human capital? Should all the 
stakeholders (owners and non-owners) be allowed an equal share of the corporation's 
residual? 
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Etzioni (1998) provides a rationale for distributing the corporation's returns. But first, 
we have to sketch briefly his own view on "investors". While accepting the moral 
legitimacy of the claim that stakeholders have some particular rights and entitlements 
(e.g. the right to bear limited liability, the right to dividends, the right to participate in 
the governance of the corporation, etc.), he maintains that the same basic claim should 
be extended to all those who invest in the corporation, an investment being not only 
an outlay of money, but also any outlay of time or any other resources, in something 
that promises a profitable return. Since investors give up some immediate benefits and 
voice in order to seek a better return for the future, Etzioni claims that they may 
legitimately expect to participate to some extent (1) in the decisions that affect what 
their return may be in the future and (2) in the decisions concerning the social usages 
of the resources they invest. This applies to all stakeholders who invest some 
resources in the corporation in expectation of a return: shareholders, large creditors, 
wholesale clients, employees who have a long record in the corporation, and 
communities which make firm-specific investments. 
Let us focus on Etzioni' s treatment of the employees. The employees' investment in 
the corporation is often referred to as human or social capital. They invest years, 
sometimes a lifetime, of their labour in the corporation. A significant part of their 
compensation lies in the future, in the expectation of being employed and paid in the 
future. Moreover they are often encouraged to believe that if they work harder, with 
dedication and loyalty, the corporation will fare better than otherwise, and generate 
higher future gains, both in terms of continued employment and flow of wages and 
benefits. Etzioni adds that a fair number of court decisions recognise employees' 
rights to employment by the corporation for which they have been working, based on 
good faith implied by continuous satisfactory service. 
It is however possible to argue against this, by claiming that employees sell their 
labour for immediate consumption by the firm (instead of making an investment). 
Hence, when they have been compensated for their work, they no longer have any 
rights to the product of their labour. Their present employment (investment) may 
generate expectations of future employment, but not a right, like e.g. the right of a 
bondholder to receive interests on his (financial) investment. It is significant in this 
respect that Etzioni (1998) doesn't mention suppliers (even large and long-term 
suppliers) in his list of stakeholders. Indeed, most of us would agree that, even if these 
suppliers may expect the firm to purchase their products or services in the future, this 
does not entitle them to claims on the corporation's future activities. In his text, he 
doesn't provide any reason why the suppliers of labour should be treated in a different 
way than other suppliers of goods or services. 
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Though the definition of stakeholders as investors seems to be a reduction of 
stakeholders to investors, let us look briefly at Etzioni's thoughts regarding the 
respective stakes of the various stakeholders in the governance of the corporation. 
Etzioni notes that in general, for all groups, the scope of their representation should 
parallel the scope of their investment. One should give more weight to employees who 
have worked for many years in the company than to those who were hired more 
recently, because long-time employees invested more in the company in terms of what 
workers invest, whose measure is approximated by counting years at work. A 
mechanism that would come close to what is envisioned here would be one in which 
employees would receive a specific number of votes according to the years they 
served in the corporation. However, claiming that "the scope of the representation of 
particular stakeholders should parallel the scope of their investment" is almost 
equivalent to saying that "the more one can affect the firm's activities, the more one 
should be allowed to participate to the decisions affecting the firm". This view of the 
stakeholders can be contrasted with the definition of Evan & Freeman (1988): 
"[The stakeholders] are the parties that can significantly affect, or are 
significantly affected by the firm's activities" (Evan & Freeman (1988), 
emphasis added). 
It seems to us that exclusive consideration of the first part of this definition, as it is the 
case in Etzioni's article, is characteristic of a strategic stakeholder theory, based on 
the "might makes right" principle, while stakeholder theory cannot claim to have 
ethical normative strength unless it takes those affected into consideration. 
In order to make our point more clearly, let us consider the case of low-skilled 
workers. Similarly to ordinary clients, ordinary workers who sell their work without 
any commitment can hardly be said to invest in the firm. The only way in which we 
can make sense of workers' investment is by considering firm-specific investments. 
However, the investment of low-skilled workers in the corporation is only marginal. If 
proportionate to that investment, the scope of their representation, if any, would be 
extremely limited, certainly when compared with the traditional (financial) investors. 
Undoubtedly, they would be powerless when confronted with the conflicting claims of 
other stakeholders, and stakeholder theory would mean no improvement to them. 
Nonetheless, we feel intuitively that normative stakeholder theory is meant precisely 
to give a voice to all the stakeholders of the corporation, and especially to protect the 
weaker stakeholders from the ambitions of the more powerful. Low-skilled workers 
are obviously not only among the weakest stakeholders of the corporation, but also 
among the stakeholders most in need of increased protection. While their personal 
investment is negligible to the corporation, the corporation is often of vital importance 
to them. Hence, we feel that their status as stakeholders of the corporation entails 
something more than their status as investors in the corporation. The things at stake 
include self-confidence, interpersonal relationships, personal identity, and, most 
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importantly, the meaning the different stakeholders are able to give to their life 
through their membership to the corporation. I will focus on these issues in sections G 
and H. But at this point, I want to come back to the question I raised in the 
introduction: what is the distinct contribution of the stakeholder concept? 
F. THE DISTINCT CONTRIBUTION OF THE STAKEHOLDER CONCEPT 
What is the distinct contribution of the stakeholder concept? If we follow the 
distinction made by Donaldson & Preston (1995) between normative, instrumental 
and descriptive stakeholder theory, the distinct contribution of the stakeholder concept 
lies according to me on the descriptive level. 
On the normative level, almost exclusively well-established existing normative 
theories have been suggested as normative cores for the stakeholder theory: e.g. the 
Kantian theory, the feminist theory, the liberal theory of property rights, the Rawlsian 
social contract theory, the "stakeholders as investors"-theory, and most recently the 
critical theory of Habermas. Hardly any new theory has been developed yet. 
On the instrumental level, we have a similar picture: well-established concepts of 
social science have been labelled and used as "stakeholder" concepts, but hardly any 
new concept has been developed yet. The latest and most developed instrumental 
stakeholder theories rely on mechanisms involving e.g. trust, power, and resource 
dependency. These mechanisms are valid when applied to stakeholders, but they were 
applied with not less success before the term "stakeholder" was invented. 
However, the stakeholder concept has, according to me, delivered a significant and 
distinct contribution on the descriptive level, by raising an awareness of the existence 
of multiple stakeholders and of diverse stakeholder interests (Preston e.a., 1999). This 
awareness has become critical because of the societal changes mentioned in the 
introduction. Though this awareness may seem to be relatively unimportant, its 
importance is not limited to the descriptive level. My claim is that it is crucial for 
normative stakeholder theory too, for two main reasons: 
1. The neo-classical (stockholder) paradigm is very difficult to overthrow because of 
the link it makes between normative and descriptive utilitarianism. Though 
descriptive utilitarianism has been shown to reflect very poorly empirical reality, it has 
not yet been abandoned, precisely because of the immense appeal of normative 
utili tarianism. 
However, since our language shapes our reality, the neo-classical rethorics based on 
this descriptive utilitarianism have focused the minds of managers on a very tiny 
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portion of the issues raised by businesses. Therefore, anyone - any ethicist - wanting to 
overthrow the dominance of the neo-classical (stockholder) paradigm needs an 
alternative descriptive account of human behaviour. Descriptive stakeholder theory 
provides us with such an account. 
2. Nonnative theories are not independent from our descriptive theories (Bowie, 1998, 
p. 48). Nonnative stakeholder theory also depends on our descriptive accounts of 
human behaviour. However, my claim is that most nonnative stakeholder theories are 
based on behavioral assumptions that either contradict the distinct contribution of the 
stakeholder concept, or assumptions that are so vague that they do not allow one to 
reject claims that contradict the distinct contribution of the stakeholder concept, 
namely the recognition that stakeholders are multiple and that theire interests are of 
diverse natures. 
The stakeholder agency theory conceptualises the stakeholders as interested primarily 
by economic (productive) efficiency, just as the transaction cost theory does. This 
means that the moral responsibility of these corporations is extemalised on the 
government or on the market, leaving to the finn the sole duty to be efficient. 
However, markets are not perfect, and it is plainly impossible to write complete laws 
and contracts.7 In addition, even perfect markets have a rather poor record of morality, 
particularly of justice. However, efficiency is not an end in itself, neither from a 
nonnative nor from a descriptive stakeholder point of view. It can help to increase 
pleasure, or happiness, justice or whatever is good for man, but of itself it has no 
moral worth. What has moral worth is to be determined by the stakeholders, and we 
should expect that they would claim various things to have moral worth. The 
stakeholders won't voluntarily adopt the mono-utilitarianism exemplified by the homo 
economicus. Therefore, externalised responsibility is not sufficient. The duty towards 
the stakeholders has to be carried out at least in part by the management. 
The social contract stakeholder theory is fundamentally ambiguous, because there can 
be as many social contract theories as there exist different sets of assumptions about 
the social contractants. I have shown above that a contract written by people 
exclusively interested in the economic efficiency of the corporation would not be 
essentially different from the contract suggested by agency theory and transaction cost 
theory. However, the opposite position, as taken by Freeman, is not better fitted to the 
stakeholder concept: indeed, he assumed, like Rawls, that all stakeholders are moved 
by the same desire to achieve an identical conception of fairness. However, if we 
7 Would Williamson be inconsistent? On the one hand, he insists on the intrinsic incompleteness of 
every contract, while on the other hand, he relies on the classical contractual mechanism, not only in 
this case, but also when he handles the classical labour contract as a sufficient means of protection for 
the workers (see infra), lowe this point to Alexia Autenne. 
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acknowledge the fact that stakeholders are multiple and their interests diverse, we 
have to recognise that Freeman's assumptions do not fit the stakeholder concept better 
than Williamson's. 
The stakeholders as investors theory rests on a similar reduction of the stakeholders to 
investors. Though different kinds of stakeholder contributions to the corporation are 
recognised (financial capital, human capital, etc.), these contributions are only valued 
according to their productive capacity. This means that it is impossible to run the 
corporation according to any other criterion than the return on investment. Since each 
stakeholder's voice is proportionate to the size of his investment, more powerful 
stakeholders will be allowed to neglect the various interests of the multiple weaker 
stakeholders. Restrictions of their liberty will be hard to justify within the "investors" 
framework. 
G. INTEGRATIVE SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY (ISCT) 
Since it seems impossible to imagine what hypothetical contractors in some abstract 
original position would decide, shouldn't we focus on the procedural rules that should 
lead actual stakeholders, and try to apply them to real life contractants? Donaldson & 
Dunfee (1994) have moved with their Integrative Social Contract Theory (ISCT) 
towards reliance on particularist rules and empirical justification, by distinguishing 
between macro-level hypemorms to which adherence is universally required, and 
micro-level contracts to which adherence can be assumed as part of the membership to 
a particular community. Hence, ISCT is able not only to provide general guidance, but 
also to reflect the context-specific complexity of intra-firms relationships. 
ISCT distinguishes between rnicrosocial contracts developed within local economic, 
political or legal communities and macrosocial contracts developed between those 
same communities. A community is defined by Donaldson & Dunfee (1994, p. 262) as 
a "self-defined, self-circumscribed group of people who interact in the context of 
shared tasks, values, or goals and who are capable of establishing norms of ethical 
behaviour for themselves". These may include firms, departments, national economic 
organisations, etc. The macro-social contract is a hypothetical contract requiring in the 
first place that managers identify, and act consistently with the legitimate ethical 
norms found in the communities in which they operate. The key terms of the macro-
social contract are as follows (Donaldson & Dunfee (1994»: 
1. Local economic and political communities may specify within their moral 
free space ethical norms for their members through microsocial contracts. 
2. Norm-generating microsocial contracts must be grounded in informed 
consent buttressed by rights of exit and voice. 
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3. In order to be obligatory, a microsocial contract norm must be compatible 
with hypemorms defined in the macrosocial contract. 8 
4. In the case of conflicts among norms satisfying the first three principles, 
priority must be established consistent with the spirit and the letter of the 
macrosocial contract.9 
Within the boundaries set by this macro-social contract, communities are left a 
substantial moral free space in order to write their own microsocial contract: 
"Although socio-political communities have the normative authority to 
prescribe [through the macro social contract] the range and nature of the 
stakeholder obligations for organisations operating within their borders, it is 
unlikely that norms resolving the full set of stakeholder issues would emerge. 
( ... ) In response to the natural 'gaps' in norms, business organisations and 
other communities would then have substantial moral free space in which to 
exercise their own ethical discretion. This firm-based moral free space in tum 
is strictly bounded by universal hypemorms and the constraints of consent, 
voice and exit established in the macrosocial contract." (Donaldson & Dunfee 
(forthcoming), emphasis added) 
These cOI11..munities may themselves formulate 'authentic' ethical norms and provide 
criteria for sorting out conflicting stakeholder interests, while hypemorms place limits 
on these authentic norms and may mandate the recognition of certain fundamental 
stakeholder claims. Consequently, the norms delineating stakeholder rights and 
obligations will vary among communities to reflect local customs, moral and cultural 
preferences, legal systems and economic goals. 
ISCT recognises a process by which legitimate ethical rules or norms may be 
identified, without mandating well-defined rules. In short, ISCT asserts that 
corporations - as communities - receive a mandate to set their own norms and 
guidelines regarding stakeholder management. Of course, this requires that all 
stakeholders would intemalise the values of conviviality, fraternity, trust and co-
operation which are charcteristic of moral communities. This process by which 
legitimate ethical rules or norms may be identified can be summarised in four steps: 
1. Relevant socio/political communities are primary sources of guidance for 
decision-makers concerning the stakeholder obligations of organisations formed or 
8 Donaldson & Dunfee suggest the use of presumption as a means for identifying relevant hypernorrns. 
9 Etzioni makes a point which nicely illustrates the need for overarching macrosocial contracts: "While 
there is no principled reason for communities to refrain from seeking to encourage corporations to grant 
them some voice in exchange for specific investments the communities made in these corporations, the 
main difficulty is that communities compete with one another over the placement of the plants and 
offices of these corporations. The more a community imposes demands for representation of or for 
other considerations, the less likely it is to attract the desired corporations. Hence, as long as there is no 
federal legislation that ensures that communities can have a voice in exchange for specific investments 
in the corporations at issue, such community representation is unlikely to come about" (Etzioni (1998) 
p.687). 
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operating within their boundaries. This guidance will be relevant primarily in 
answering the basic questions raised by stakeholder theory: Who are the stakeholders? 
How should we balance competing stakeholder claims? etc. Admittedly, this strategy 
will raise a set of thorny interpretation issues about the authentic norms of particular 
communities. Nevertheless, this approach has the merit to acknowledge that one 
cannot afford to neglect wholly empirical issues. The norms and preferences of the 
relevant communities could perfectly reflect the precepts of agency theory and give 
substantial preference to the interests of shareholders over other stakeholders. But 
other patterns could also emerge. 
2. Where norms pertaining to stakeholder obligations are not firmly established in 
the relevant socio/political communities, organisations have substantial discretion in 
deciding how to respond to stakeholder claims and interests. Organisations can 
therefore be expected to develop their own set of values concerning stakeholder 
interests within their realm of moral free space. Organisation-specific values will gain 
in importance when the boundaries set by the macro and microsocial contracts will be 
less stringent. Consistent with many of the virtue theories popular today, the core 
values chosen within the corporation are particularly critical in guiding decision-
making about stakeholder obligations. 
3. All decisions which affect the stakeholders must be consistent with 
hypernorms.10 
4. In those cases in which transactions cross the boundaries of communities having 
conflicting legitimate norms concerning stakeholder obligations, Donaldson & Dunfee 
suggest that priority should be given to the norms of the community having the most 
significant interests in the decision. 
The Integrated Social Contract Theory of the stakeholders recognises a process by 
which legitimate ethical rules or norms may be identified, without mandating well-
defined rules. ISCT represents therefore an important achievement towards the 
recognition of the moral validity of particular and contingent moral claims of 
stakeholders. However, I would like to contribute to the development of this theory by 
paying attention to the two following issues: the definition of the community, and the 
procedural rules for identifying valid moral norms within the community. 
G.]. The boundaries o/the community 
Since the notion of community refers primarily to a local unit within a global system 
of interaction, boundaries are constitutive of communities. But where should we set 
these boundaries? Donaldson & Dunfee suggest a definition of the cOInmunity as "any 
self-circumscribed group of people who interact in the context of shared tasks, values 
to Donaldson & Dunfee (1998) claim that it is not necessary to have a formal list of hypernorms for the 
concept to be valuable to organisational decision-makers. 
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or goals, and who are capable of establishing norms of ethical behaviour for 
themselves". Though communities participate to a logic of relative exclusion by their 
very nature as bounded, local units, this definition leaves according to us the door 
open to too stringent forms of exclusion. Imagine shareholders and managers would 
agree to form a community which they would call "the corporation" and from which 
they would exclude any other party. They fit perfectly well within this definition of 
community. Imagine further that they would agree on a list of stakeholders of their 
"corporation", comprising only the suppliers, thereby neglecting the interests of other 
parties. Would that be reasonable? Most of us wouldn't agree with that. But on what 
grounds could we reject that agreement? Donaldson & Dunfee would object that this 
is not compatible with the norms defined by the higher-level socio-economic 
communities under whose legal authority the organisation is established (most often 
national states). However, my point here is the following: ISCT fails to give any clear 
rule that would enable us to know which parties should be recognised as legitimate 
members of a corporate community. We would argue that, without an understanding 
of the boundaries of this community, it is not possible to provide a full account of the 
kind of moral self-determination which is suggested by ISCT. 
A more useful definition would be the definition of the corporation as a co-operative 
venture for mutual advantage, based on the principle of fairness (Phillips (1997)). The 
argument is that obligations of fairness arise when individuals and groups interact for 
mutual benefit. Phillips argues that these obligations are distinct from - and precede -
the obligations that flow from consent, whether explicit, tacit or implicit. Though, 
others (e.g. Nozick, Dunfee) have argued that the activity requisite for the creation of 
obligations of fairness amounts to nothing more than 'tacit' or 'implicit' consent. 
Many objections have been raised regarding both tacit consent (e.g. the nature of the 
attitudinal factors from which one can adequately conclude that tacit consent has been 
given) and the distinct nature of obligations of fairness that would not devolve into 
some kind of consent. Without taking position in this intricate debate, 11 we can argue 
that, whether based on consent or on fairness, to the extent that a person or group is 
involved in a co-operative scheme with others involving the voluntary receipt of 
benefits, an obligation is owed to these other participants. However, since virtually 
any economic transaction may be interpreted as a co-operative scheme (this idea is as 
old as Adam Smith), all the parties which conclude economic transactions with the 
corporation can rightly claim to be stakeholders of this corporation. All stakeholder 
groups are, to varying degrees, involved in the same economic co-operative scheme, 
and the success of each is intertwined with the success of all others. 
11 The difference is not only a matter of vocabulary. Phillips claims e.g. that what he defines as 
obligations of fairness exist even if the obligation creating implications of such activities are unknown 
to the benefitee, while according to consent-based theories, the knowledge of the content of the 
obligation is an imperative prerequisite to consent. 
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Under this definition, those parties who don't contribute anything to the corporation 
are not stakeholders, though they can be themselves significantly affected by the 
corporation through positive or negative externalities. These parties are not part of a 
co-operative venture. Under this definition, terrorists would not be counted as 
stakeholders, although they may still merit prudential consideration. Another 
controversy has arisen about competitors. Our suggestion would be that some 
competitors are likely to be part of a co-operative venture with the corporation, 
through joint lobbying efforts, joint ventures, joint R&D, etc. These competitors are 
obviously stakeholders. However, aggressive competitors that behave as if the market 
was the arena of a struggle-for-life are not, though they still merit as much prudential 
consideration. 
Some people may object to this definition. The case of low-skilled unemployed may 
be emblematic: they are not members of any co-operative game, they are not in any 
meaningful sense members of a particular corporate community, they cannot claim 
compensation for bearing the costs of externalities. Nevertheless, many people feel 
that corporations have a positive responsibility to provide jobs to these people (see 
Schokkaert & Sweeney (1998)). We would agree with this, but while every 
corporation can be argued to have a moral duty to provide jobs to low-skilled 
unemployed (whether in virtue of a hypernorm or any other arrangement), no one 
would seriously hold that these people could have legitimate claims over one 
particular company. In contrast, any party defined supra as a stakeholder, is most 
likely to be a stakeholder of only a limited number of corporations; the vast majority 
of corporations of which it is not a stakeholder don't have any responsibility towards 
it. A supplier e.g. has a claim on these firms of which he is a supplier, but on these 
firms only; everyone will agree that his fortune is indifferent to any other corporation. 
While the claims of stakeholders are particular, the claims of low-skilled unemployed 
are general. Admittedly, this doesn't facilitate the enforcement of their claim, but this 
shows clearly that they are not stakeholders of a particular corporation in the common 
sense of this term. 
G.2. The rules for identifying valid moral norms within the community 
Donaldson & Dunfee suggest that norm-generating microsocial contracts must be 
grounded in informed consent buttressed by rights of exit and voice. The notion of 
free and informed consent lies indeed at the basis of contractualistic ethics (Scanlon 
(1982)). However, the notions of rationality and freedom have been hotly debated 
topics during the whole history of Western philosophy (Jaggar (1993)). In addition, 
actual human relations always emerge in a context of unequal power. Therefore, we 
should not aim at realising the ideal moral dialogue envisioned either by Habermas, or 
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by social contract theorists, when they construct the conditions of such a dialogue in 
an ideal original position. This ideal are simply unattainable. 
Moreover, the ideal of free, rational and fully informed subjects conflicts with the 
basic contribution of stakeholder theory, i.e. the recognition that stakeholders pursue 
different goals, have different conceptions of rationality, and are powerful to various 
degrees. Therefore, we should rather try to achieve consensus between actual 
stakeholders evolving in actual conditions. Of course, this is a risky strategy, because 
the pursuit of consensus can foster the rejection of dis sensus and divergence. Though 
not under ideal conditions, the moral dialogue between the stakeholders must take 
place in minimal conditions of fairness. This implies that all parties should be 
recognised as full-status stakeholders, and that they would follow some set of 
principles of fair bargaining, without privileging one party over the others. 
Unfortunately, there is in practice considerable room for controversy in identifying all 
the parties concerned, in identifying the principles of fair bargaining, and in drawing 
conclusions from them. What we need here is some principle of rationality and some 
principle of justice. But whose justice? And whose rationality? These questions 
amount to the basic questions of stakeholder theory: how should we distribute the 
benefits earned within the co-operative venture among the different stakeholders, 
given that all the participants' contributions are necessary but different in nature? I 
would like to suggest an answer to this question which is based on a common good 
that could function as a common reference scheme for the various stakeholders. 
H. STAKEHOLDER THEORY AND THE COMMON GOOD. 
Though Donaldson & Dunfee claim that ISCT can serve as a normative foundation for 
several kinds of stakeholder theories, hence that communities may develop 
stakeholder norms reflecting the utilitarian, Confucian, or even anti-Kantian 
preferences of their members, I have shown that some norms, e.g. utilitarian norms, 
are not in harmony with the stakeholder intuition; therefore, though they are valid in 
themselves, they cannot serve as basis for a normative stakeholder theory. I now 
submit that a normative core based on the community and the common good is more 
in harmony with the stakeholder intuition. 12 
The nature of co-operative ties between the stakeholders seems to imply the existence 
of a common good, that would be shared by the members of the relevant community. 
12 Some have suggested feminist ethics as a normative basis of stakeholder theory. Though many 
feminist insights could add to our understanding of the corporation as a moral community, I am not 
convinced that feminist ethics could really function as normative basis for stakeholder theory, because: 
"Feminists see our preoccupation with justice whether in the guide of respecting rights or of standing on 
a principle or of adhering to rules, as an impediment to social progress and the furtherance of the 
general goods." (Jackson (1995), p. 107). 
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But can we really think of the corporation in tenns of a community trying to achieve 
some common good (goal), shared by all its members? Does it mean that the good of 
the individual is subordinated to the smooth running of the corporation? In political 
philosophy, the societal 'common good' is often seen as conflicting with individual 
goods, as if the pursuit of a personal objective was incompatible with the good of 
society, or as if the latter was a burden to individuals. Fortunately, this needs not be 
the case, particularly if one defines the common good as: "The overall conditions of 
life in society that allow the different groups and their members to achieve their own 
perfection more fully and more easily" (Argandofia (1998), p. 1095). This common 
good is truly a good in its own right: it is not the sum of the individual goals of its 
members, and its primacy does not exclude the pursuit of private ends as such; it only 
precludes the pursuit of private ends to the detriment of the common good. 
What does this mean to private finns? This theory of the common good may help us 
to understand that the main duty of each stakeholder is to contribute his part in 
achieving the company's goal, in other words, to contribute to its common good, 
firstly by providing whichever factor they have agreed to provide, and secondly by 
creating the conditions in which each member of the company receives from the 
company whatever he has a right to receive by virtue of his contribution. The 
stakeholders have the duty to contribute to the common corporate good, which in turn 
has something to do with creating the conditions that will enable the stakeholders to 
achieve their personal goods. 
But what is that common good of the corporation? Probably, that it would survive, 
grow and prosper in order to achieve its reason for existence, as simply stated in the 
company by-laws. Admittedly, this doesn't encompass the particular interests of the 
different stakeholders, but this is obviously necessary for the corporation to create the 
conditions that will enable the stakeholders to achieve their personal goods. Though it 
is different from the particular interests of all the stakeholders, it is nonetheless 
desired by all stakeholders, and in this sense, a truly common good. Hence, the 
common good of a corporation may be conceptualised as the intersection between the 
interests of all stakeholders (see Figure 1). In legal tenns, this intersection corresponds 
to the sum of the derivative interests of the stakeholders (Leader (1998)). Derivative 
interests have an internal link with the company, while interests that are external to the 
company are called personal interests. 
This distinction is not connected to the differences found between stakeholders. 
Instead, every stakeholder has interests which are related only to themselves, and 
others that are related to the objective of the corporation. While the latter would 
appear to be dominant on the corporate agenda, the fonner would appear to be 
secondary in nature. Hence, when the management sets the corporate agenda, it should 
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not seek to strike a fair balance between the various interests of the stakeholders. 
Rather, it should identify the best means to help the company to prosper according to 
its own objectives, and only in a second phase ask about the fairest way in which to 
distribute the resulting costs and benefits among the stakeholders. The functionality of 
the corporation should be the dominant objective, tempered by objectives of personal 
justice, but not overruled by them.!3 
Figure 1,' The traditional representation of the firm as a vehicle for co-ordinating 
stakeholder interests (right) and the new representation of the firm as the a vehicle for the 
pursuit of the common good ofthe stakeholders (left). 
This allows us to re-think the fiduciary duty of managers: this fiduciary duty is not 
towards any particular stakeholder, but it is a duty to further the interests of the 
company, and consequently to satisfy some of the interests of the stakeholders - their 
derivative interests. However, since all stakeholder naturally want the company to 
prosper and their own interests to be satisfied, there is always a risk that, if given too 
much decision-power, a particular stakeholder would neglect the common good in 
order to achieve his own personal interest. In If the corporation fails to give the 
priority to the common objectives, than its members can generally activate two 
recuperation mechanisms, either 'exit' or 'voice', to correct the failure (Hirschman 
(1970)). If the 'exit' option is readily available, if people are free to leave without 
incurring exit costs, then the company doesn't have the duty to set up 'voice' 
mechanisms. However, if the stakeholders are the members of a community, then it is 
reasonable to argue that, though the 'exit' option may be available to them, this option 
has a cost. If any, the cost of breaking moral ties of trust and loyalty. Consequently, 
the stakeholders should have the opportunity to exercise voice from within the 
community; in other words, adequate mechanisms should be designed so that the 
13 Notice that, if conceptualised this way, a firm is obviously more than a mere forum for furthering 
stakeholder interests, as argued by Evan & Freeman (1988). 
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stakeholders would be able to exercise democratic control over the management. 14 
Therefore, in corporate communities, democratic governance is required, whereby 
every stakeholder will have the opportunity to make sure that the manager doesn't 
give to any personal interests the priority over the common interest. However, since 
all stakeholders have personal interests that they will want to protect from abuse by 
the company, or advance at the expense of the company, there will always be room for 
conflicts, not only between stakeholders, but also between stakeholders and the 
management. The membership to the community does not imply neither silent 
compliance with the alleged "common good", nor a total sacrifice to the interests of 
the other members of the community. 
One direction for future developments of the theory sketched here is to make a 
detailed analysis of the procedures of decision making that would be adequate within 
a corporate community, both on strategic and on operational levels. E.g.: To what 
extent are the different stakeholders invited to participate to the definition of the 
corporate objectives? I would like to suggest tentatively the following rules of 
corporate governance: 
1. There should be an independent body able to make the distinction between 
personal and derivative interests. 
2. This body should provide the stakeholders with detailed feedback about the 
way this distinction was made. 
3. The pursuit of derivative interests should be assigned to a body of managers, 
placed under control by a board of directors that should comprise 
representatives of all stakeholders. 
4. The pursuit of personal interests involves important considerations about 
justice that should be debated in a forum where all stakeholders are 
represented. 
Another direction for improvement is to analyse the nature of the relationships 
between the corporation and those who were not defined here as its stakeholders: the 
state, the unemployed, the larger public, etc. E.g.: What is the content of the 
hypernorms? A real challenge to democratic governance is indeed to bridge the gap 
between the corporate objectives and the objectives of wider social democracy. 
14 Dunfee provides another argument in favour of internal voice mechanisms: "some form of voice ( ... ) 
is critical to employee judgements that a firm has acted justly" (Dunfee (1998), p. 23). This argument is 
based only on the employee perceptions of procedural justice, which cannot be assumed to have 
unconditional moral strength. However, it can have practical relevance for the managers who must 
secure the co-operation of all stakeholders. 
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I. CONCLUSION 
The approach defended at the end of this paper is clearly non-universalist; indeed, it 
has been to show that several ethical dimensions of human communities are inherently 
present in every corporation. Indeed, this approach has been adopted after having 
rejected all attempts to provide stakeholder theory with a universalist normative core. 
However, we don't think that universalism is required (see Wicks (1998)). On the 
contrary, non-universalism provides an opportunity to recognise the wide variety of 
values that may guide decision-making in corporations that are themselves infinitely 
varied. Though the recognition of this variety may be painful to some academics, we 
think that it is a sine qua non for business people to adhere to the discourse of 
business ethicists. The conclusions drawn from the concept of the corporation as a 
community (w.r.t. democratic governance and respect for the stakeholders) could be 
formulated from other perspectives as well, but this one is likely to appeal to the basic 
understanding, shared by most of us, and by most business people, of man as a moral 
being, capable of moral choices, and seeking to give meaning to his life. In this 
context, the community is not only a question of formal equality of rights, but 
primarily a matter of transforming relations of unequal power into relations of co-
operation and participation. 
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